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I. INTRODUCTION
The antitrust laws in the U.S. are designed to protect competition
and punish behavior that damages competition.' Innovation, invention,
and the development of new products are vital to competition. Some
companies, hiding behind the strong policy favoring innovation, have
made changes to their products that are at least as damaging to corn-
1. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co.v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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petitors as they are innovative.2 These actions may harm competition
and innovation in a given market, an effect that is contrary to the pur-
poses of antitrust law.
This Comment looks at the courts' handling of the problem of de-
sign changes that harm competitors, especially design changes to high
technology products, where courts claim to be ill-equipped to evaluate
the merits of the changes.3 It examines the U.S. federal antitrust laws
and relevant case law that have determined the extent to which a com-
pany can make design changes that damage competition. It also ex-
amines whether the US antitrust laws, passed to handle anticompetitive
behavior in markets vastly different from the high technology and in-
formation markets of today, and not significantly altered since, are ca-
pable of effectively regulating anticompetitive design behavior in these
new markets. This Comment then applies those laws to Microsoft's
integration of Internet Explorer into Windows 95 and 98. Finally, it
examines whether there is a better way to separate anticompetitive de-
sign behavior from acceptable design behavior.
Il. BACKGROUND
A. History of American Antitrust Laws
Laws regulating trade can be traced to the reign of Hammurabi in
Babylon, whose famous law code "protected the populace from the un-
scrupulous who might seek unreasonable profit at the expense of the
weak."4 In 1773 in Boston, colonists protested the King's grant of a
monopoly to the East India Company by dumping tea into Boston Har-
bor.' The events in Boston eventually led to the American Revolution,
"causing many historians to cite antimonopoly sentiments as one of the
roots of the struggle for American independence. ' 6 Indeed, the Con-
stitution, like the antitrust laws, is based on a fundamental dislike and
distrust of centralized power.7
2. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76,94 (2d. Cir.
1981) (noting support existed for the argument that AT&T purposely incorporated significant and
unnecessary disadvantages into a coupler to prevent Northeastern from competing).
3. See Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 278 (N.D. Okla.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
4. 1 THE ANTrUST IMPULSE 4 (Theodore P. Kovaleffed., M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1994).
5. See id., at 5.
6. Id.
7. See U.S. CONST. arts. 1, 11, and III (implying a system of checks and balances to prevent
any one branch of government from gaining too much power). See also U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8 and
amend. X (granting Congress only the enumerated powers, reserving the remaining powers to the
states).
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Years later, the Civil War caused massive industrial growth
which eventually led to consolidation.8 Consolidation, in turn, gave
rise to a growing fear of the impact of the new monopolies on the
country.9 By 1884, a party known as the Anti-Monopoly Party ran a
candidate for President.10 In 1888 the Republican Party included in its
platform the "opposition to all combinations of capital organized in
trusts or otherwise to control arbitrarily the condition of trade among
our citizens."" Also in 1888, Ohio Senator John Sherman introduced
an antitrust bill in Congress, expressing alarm at the potential unrest
threatened by outrage expressed for the trusts.' 2 In 1890 the Sherman
Act, a compromise bill, passed unanimously in the House and with one
dissenting vote in the Senate.13 Twenty-five years later, the Clayton
Act was passed to strengthen and extend the scope of the Sherman Act
by making illegal some acts Congress feared the Sherman Act left un-
covered. 14
B. The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act
Section 2 of the Sherman Act deals with monopolization and at-
tempted monopolization by a single firm: "Every person who shall mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony."'15 In order to establish monopolization un-
der section 2, case law has held that a plaintiff must prove possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market and willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power.16 The willful acquisition or maintenance
requirement has been interpreted to mean the use of one's monopoly
power to "'foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or
to destroy a competitor." 1 7 However, section 2 does not prevent ac-
quiring monopoly status by virtue of a "superior product, business
acumen, or historical accident."' 8 Thus, in many cases where plaintiffs
8. See I THE ANTITRUST IMPULSE, supra note 4, at 7.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id, at 8.
12. See RUDOLPH J. R. PERrrZ, COMPETITIONPOLICYINAmRCA, 1888-1992, at 9 (1996).
13. See I THE ANTITRUST IMPULSE, supra note 4, at 8.
14. See id, at 11-12.
15. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
16. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 426-32 (2d Cir. 1945).
17. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,482-83 (1992).
18. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
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had charged anticompetitive design conduct, defendants successfully
defended design changes as necessary for a superior product.19
Many plaintiffs charging anticompetitive design conduct complain
that the design unlawfully ties two products together with technology. 20
These tying arrangements are forbidden by sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act and by section 3 of the Clayton Act.21 Section 1 states
that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States... is hereby declared to be illegal.' '22 Section 3 of the Clayton
Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce... to
lease or make a sale or contract for sale in goods, wares, mer-
chandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities ... on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or pur-
chaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods .... of a com-
petitor... where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for
sale... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to cre-
ate a monopoly in any line of commerce.23
There appears to be no difference between a Sherman Act unlaw-
ful tying arrangement and a Clayton Act unlawful tying arrangement. 24
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show three elements
in order to establish a per se tying violation.25 First, there must be two
separate products, the purchase of one conditioned on the purchase of
the other. Courts frequently refer to this as the coercion element.26
Second, the seller must possess economic power in the tying product
market sufficient to restrain competition in the tied product market.27
Third, more than an insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied
product market must be affected.28
19. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 (2d Cir. 1979);
Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 342 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.) (per curiam).
20. See, e.g., Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 268.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2, 14 (1994).
22. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
23. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
24. See In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
("The requisite elements under the two statutes are now 'virtually identical."') (quoting Moore v.
Jas H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1977)).
25. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co.v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
26. See, e.g., Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 541-542 (9th
Cir. 1983).
27. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6.
28. See id.
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The court in In re Data General noted that the inquiry into
whether there is a per se tying violation does not end when the three
elements are met.29 Courts have recognized exceptional circumstances
in which legitimate business justifications may save a tying arrange-
ment that otherwise possesses the requisite elements of a per se viola-
tion.30 In many cases, courts have allowed design changes which al-
legedly tie two products with technology because the new integrated
product offers better performance or costs less. 31
In addition, an alleged tying arrangement that does not meet the
requirements of a per se violation may still be condemned under a rule
of reason test under Section 1 of the Sherman ActA2 "Where a per se
claim fails, plaintiff does not necessarily fail altogether in his claim.
He simply loses the benefit of the presumption of harm provided by the
per se rule and must show the actual effect of the alleged anticompeti-
tive practice on the market."33 However, one court has held that even
to reach a rule of reason analysis, the plaintiff must first satisfy the
first element of a per se violation: the existence of a tie-in.34
C. Statement of the Problem:
Are the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act Suitable to Decide
Whether Design Choices Made by High Technology
Companies are Anticompetitive?
Congress passed the Sherman Act to manage problems such as
the sugar trust and the famous Standard Oil Trust.35 Oil and sugar are
industries well described by traditional economics because they are
fungible. If the supply of these products increases, prices decrease. In
the 108 years since the passage of the Sherman Act, business has
changed dramatically. Information-based businesses are now a signifi-
29. See In re Data Gen. Corp., 490 F. Supp. at 1101.
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 (2d Cir. 1979);
Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 342 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). The court in Data General also
notes that some courts look at legitimate business justifications when deciding whether the elements
of a per se tying violation are met and some courts treat legitimate business justifications as a de-
fense after a per se violation has been established. The distinction is not important because the re-
sult is the same under each treatment. See In re Data Gen. Corp., 490 F. Supp. at 1101 n.12.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See, e.g., Foremost Pro Color Inc., 703 F.2d at 542.
33. Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 603 F. Supp. 646,
648 (D. N.J. 1984).
34. See id.
35. See PERrrz, supra note 12.
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cant sector of the economy. These businesses are not well modeled by
the traditional economic theories on which the Sherman Act was
based.36 With these new industries, "innovation and standard design
will be more important to antitrust analysis than the traditional pricing
and output considerations." 37
For example, when a person chooses what brand of sugar to pur-
chase, that person is probably not influenced by the brand his neighbor
uses. Rather, he makes his decision based on such things as price and
quality. However, when a person chooses computer software, the
software her neighbor uses and whether his software is compatible
with hers may be more of an important factor than the price and the
quality of the software because she desires to exchange information
with her neighbor via computer. Economists refer to this phenomenon
as "network externalities. '38 That is, "the value of some products in-
creases as more people use the product and, with broad use, the prod-
uct becomes in effect an industry standard, which can in some in-
stances make it exceedingly difficult for non-conforming products to
enter the market even if they are technologically 'superior'."39
Accordingly, antitrust laws designed to deal with sugar and Stan-
dard Oil may be ill-equipped to regulate new technology and informa-
tion-based businesses, which are subject to network externalities. This
comment analyzes whether the veracity of this proposition by examin-
ing the scope of the legitimate business justification defense for design
conduct that damages competitors.
I. ANALYsis
Several courts have analyzed circumstances where design changes
made by high technology companies damaged competitors.40 Gener-
36. See Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End, 48 SMU L. REV. 1749, 1771 (1995).
37. Id.
38. Wynne S. Carville, Antitrust Issues in Management of Intellectual Property, in
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1998, at 59, 96 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-4037, 1998).
39. l
40. The cases analyzed in this comment are Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 613
F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.
1983); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Data Gen.
Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Innovative Data Processing, Inc. v.
International Bus. Machs., 585 F. Supp. 1470 (D.NJ. 1984); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American.
Tel. and Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc.,
537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp.
965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affd sub nom. Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Machs.
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ally, plaintiffs allege either tying, prohibited by section 1 of the
Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act; or monopolization,
prohibited by section 2 of the Sherman Act; or both.41 These two types
of antitrust complaints are analyzed separately.
A. Tying Arrangements
The three elements necessary for a finding of an illegal tying ar-
rangement are coercion to buy the tied product, market power in the
tying product market, and an effect on more than an insubstantial
amount of commerce.42 Generally, the first element, customer coer-
cion, is the most problematic for plaintiffs alleging technological ties. 43
The courts have evolved an analysis of these elements over the years.
1. The Early Cases: The IBM Cases
The courts first addressed the problem of anticompetitive design
behavior in the 1970s with a series of cases challenging IBM's intro-
duction of a new computer system that integrated memory, which was
previously plugged-in externally, into the central processing unit
("CPU").44 The change in the design of the CPU prevented users from
choosing memory made by companies other than IBM.45
IBM is a manufacturer of computers which has been "deeply in-
volved in the phenomenal growth of the electronic data processing in-
dustry since almost the beginning of the industry. '46 In 1964, IBM in-
troduced system 360, which was technically superior to anything on
the market47, and suited to a variety of scientific and commercial
Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983); Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F.
Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (per cu-
riam).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2, 14(1994).
42. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Foremost Pro Color Inc., 703 F.2d at 542.
44. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727
(9th Cir. 1979); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th
Cir. 1977); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423
(N.D. Cal. 1978), affid sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d
1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp.
258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); In
re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff d sub
nom. Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1983).
45. See Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 305.
46. Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 270.
47. See 3 PHI.LIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTrRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS 39 (rev. ed. 1996).
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uses.48 Machines of the system 360 era had a central processing unit
(CPU) into which an end-user plugged peripheral machines to perform
specific data storage, input, and output functions.49 The peripherals,
which attached to the CPUs, were a lucrative part of IBM's business
and attracted competition from other companies.50 These companies
made peripherals which could be plugged into IBM CPUs, and thus
became known in the industry as plug-compatible manufacturers
(PCMs). 1 IBM responded to competition from PCMs by reducing
prices on the peripherals where it faced the heaviest competition, and
by offering discounted leases to customers who agreed to use IBM pe-
ripherals.5 2 IBM also integrated memory, the disk drive, and some
control functions previously done by peripherals into the CPU of the
system 370, the next generation computer.53
In 1973, the Northern District of Oklahoma faced the problem of
an alleged technological tie in Telex v. IBM. Telex filed suit against
BM challenging IBM's integration of the memory and the CPU in the
system 370.54 Telex complained that IBM's integration of memory
and memory control into the CPU was an unlawful tying arrange-
ment.5 5 The court noted at the trial that "[b]y 1970, some plug com-
patible devices offered.., by PCMs were, in fact, functionally supe-
rior to, and were regarded by IBM as superior to, their corresponding
IBM products. ' '56 In addition, at least one IBM employee testified that
one of the motivations for the bundling of memory and memory control
with the CPU was to reduce exposure to plug compatible competition
because their low-cost and often superior products would likely con-
tinue to chip away at IBM's share of the peripheral market.57 In spite
of this evidence, the court concluded that BM had not behaved anti-
competitively because IBM's integrated product was technologically
48. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965, 972 (N.D.
Cal. 1979), affid sub nom. Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 698
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377,
1380 (9th Cir. 1983) affig In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965
(N.D. Cal. 1979).
50. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 973.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 47, at 40.
54. See Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 268.
55. See id.
56. Id. at291.
57. See id. at 306.
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superior since it ran faster than the non-integrated version and was less
expensive. "While... there is some evidence [IBM's] ac-
tions... were designed to help stem the growth of its plug compatible
competition, we conclude that the predominant evidence demonstrates
that they really represented technological advancements .... -51 Thus,
the court formulated the following rule on technological ties: if the new
product is technologically superior to the old, the issue is beyond the
reach of the antitrust laws. The design is not anticompetitive, regard-
less of the intent of the designer.59
The court was spared from determining whether this actually was
a tying arrangement because IBM continued to offer CPUs without
integrated memory.60 However, in the discussion of whether the prod-
ucts were tied, the court showed extensive deference to the arguments
by BM that its product integration was technologically superior, a
common theme in opinions involving anticompetitive design conduct.61
In concluding there could be no tying arrangement, the court was ap-
parently persuaded by the fact that the memory control and the CPU
were in the same box: "where a court is dealing with what is physically
and in fact a single product, Section 3 does not contemplate judicial
dissection of that product into parts and the reconstitution of these
parts into a tying agreement." 62 The court also noted this was not a
tying arrangement because IBM was merely following the industry
standard, noting that "[c]ontrol of memory function has been integrated
with processing functions over a long period of time in varying de-
grees. '63 The court's comment ignores the fact that IBM's dominance
in the CPU market allowed it to essentially dictate the industry stan-
dards.64
The court concluded that
[t]he integration of which plaintiffs complain involves in form or
substance no tying of the sale or lease of one product to that of an-
other. To rule otherwise would enmesh the courts with technical
and uncertain inquiry into the technological justifiability of func-
58. Id. at 342.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 347 ("The integrated control in the System 370 is wholly optional. IBM con-
tinues to offer central processing units and to lease independent controllers from IBM, Telex, or
whomsoever they choose.").
61. See id.
62. 1&i
63. I.
64. The court itself noted, "this extraordinary industry [has been] dominated.., by BM's
influence." I. at 278.
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tional integration and cast unfortunate doubt on the legality of
product innovations in serious detriment to the industry and with-
out legitimate antitrust purpose.65
Thus the Northern District of Oklahoma signaled its preference
for deferring to the judgment of the litigants on technical matters in-
stead of insisting that the technical merits of a particular product be
vigorously litigated and decided by the court.
Telex was reversed on other grounds by the Tenth Circuit in
1975.66
2. The Fifth Circuit Approach: An Intent-Based Test
Soon after Telex, the Fifth Circuit decided Response of Carolina,
Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc.67 Leasco was a computer time-sharing
company68 that leased computer time to small businesses. 69 Customers
had terminals they used to dial in to Leasco's to perform tasks such as
inventory control and payroll. 70 Response of Carolina bought a fran-
chise from Leasco to provide Leasco time-sharing services in the
southeastern United States.71 Response of Carolina complained Lea-
sco forced Response of Carolina to lease a particular hardware con-
figuration as a condition of its purchase of a Leasco franchise because
it would be technologically impossible for Response of Carolina to
configure other hardware for the Leasco software.72 Response of
Carolina argued this was an illegal tying arrangement, in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.73
The court found no evidence of the coercion necessary to satisfy
the first element of a per se tying arrangement violation because there
was no evidence suggesting Leasco would have declined to turn over
the necessary technical information to properly configure hardware
purchased from someone other than Leasco. 74 Though the court found
no tying arrangement in this situation, it noted a willingness to con-
demn technological relationships between products if a design was
65. Id. at 347.
66. See Telex Corp., 510 F.2d at 897.
67. See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
68. See id. at 1310.
69. See id. at 1328.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1310.
72. See id. at 1329.
73. See id.
74. See Id.
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chosen solely for an illegal purpose, such as to effectuate a tying ar-
rangement, and not because it was technologically superior:
In some instances, two products might be illegally tied through
the technological relationship between them. If, for example, the
systems software was designed to only be compatible with a spe-
cific hardware configuration, and that specific hardware configu-
ration, because it is based on information held only by the seller,
is only available from that seller, then a violation might be found.
But such a violation must be limited to those instances where the
technological factor tying the hardware to the software has been
designed for the purpose of tying the products, rather than to
achieve some technologically beneficial result.75
In effect, the court ruled that if a plaintiff shows that a design
change was motivated solely by anticompetitive intent of the defendant,
the design change violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.76
3. The Ninth Circuit Approach
a. A District Court Interpretation
The Northern District of California tackled a technological tying
case in 1980 in In re Data General.77 The defendant Data General
sold computer systems.78 The plaintiffs79 competed with Data Gen-
eral's CPUs, memory boards, and software used with the CPUs.80 The
plaintiffs complained that Data General tied the licensing of its soft-
ware to the sale of its CPUs, and one plaintiff, Ampex Corp., also
claimed that Data General unlawfully tied the sale of its CPUs to the
sale of its memory boards.8" The court rejected Data General's argu-
ment that the CPU/memory and the CPU/software ties were techno-
logically superior and cheaper because Data General failed to show
that any technological benefits would be lost if the CPU, memory, and
software were sold separately, and failed to show that any cost savings
from integration was passed on to the consumer.82 The court held is-
sues of fact remained as to whether there was a tying arrangement, and
75. Id. at 1330.
76. See id.
77. See In re Data Gen. Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
78. See id. at 1097.
79. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., SCI Systems, Inc., Digidyne Corp, Bytronix
Corp., Ampex Corp., and Data Compass Corp.
80. See In re Data Gen. Corp., 490 F. Supp. at 1098.
81. See id. at 1097.
82. See idU at 1105 (software tie), 1109 (memory tie and cost savings), 1110.
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therefore denied cross motions for summary judgment." The court es-
sentially adopted the simple rule of Telex: any design that is faster or
cheaper cannot be anticompetitive.84
b. The Ninth Circuit Speaks: Foremost Pro Color
The Ninth Circuit addressed technological ties in 1983 in Fore-
most Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak Co." Foremost Pro Color was
one of a series of cases challenging Kodak's introduction of a new
camera, the 110 Instamatic system, which required "a remarkable new
film," Kodacolor ]1.H6 Kodacolor II essentially rendered obsolete Ko-
dak's previous color film, Kodacolor X, because Kodacolor II was a
less grainy film, and therefore a superior product to most consumers.87
Kodacolor II had to be developed using a different process than Koda-
color X, thus independent film developers had to make large invest-
ments in new equipment to compete with Kodak in the photofinishing
market.88 Foremost Pro Color alleged that Kodak's design changes
forced it to purchase an entire new supply of film, chemicals, and pa-
per.89 Thus, Foremost Pro Color alleged that Kodak tied cameras to
film, film to chemicals, and chemicals to paper and film, in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act.90
The Ninth Circuit decided there was no coercion, however, be-
cause Kodak required no additional products to be purchased as a con-
dition of a sale.9' Rather, buying the additional products was simply a
prerequisite to practical and effective use of the tying product.92 Per-
haps expressing its irritation with technological tying arrangement
cases, the Foremost Pro Color court adopted the harsh rule that design
conduct alone can never form an illegal tying arrangement.9 Rather,
additional anticompetitive conduct is required to support a violation:
"[w]e do not believe that, standing alone, such technological interrela-
83. See id. at 1124.
84. Compare Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 305-06, with In re Data Gen. Corp., 490 F.
Supp. at 1105, 1109 (denying motion for summary judgment because defendant failed to show in-
tegrated product was technologically superior or cheaper to consumers).
85. See Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534,537 (9th Cir. 1983).
86. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 278 (2d Cir. 1979).
87. See id. at 277.
88. See id. at 290.
89. See Foremost Pro Color Inc., 703 F.2d at 537.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 542.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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tionship among complementary products is sufficient to establish the
coercion essential to a per se unlawful tying arrangement." 94  The
court reasoned "such a rule could become a roadblock to the competi-
tion vital for an ever expanding and improving economy. Product in-
novation, particularly in such technologically advancing industries as
the photographic industry, is in many cases the essence of competitive
conduct. 9 5 Incredibly, the court went on to say that a design choice
that is incompatible with competitor's products
does not foreclose competition; rather, it increases competition by
providing consumers with a choice among differing technologies,
advanced and standard, and by providing competing manufactur-
ers the incentive to enter the new product market by developing
similar products of advanced technology. Any short-run absence
of competition in the market for the technologically tied product
could just as likely be due to the unwillingness or inability of
competitors to devote sufficient economic resources to match the
pace of technological development set by the industry's leader, as
to the abuse of market power by that dominant firm. 9 6
Foremost Pro Color decided: "[a]s a general rule, therefore, we
hold that the development and introduction of a system of technologi-
cally interrelated products is not sufficient alone to establish a per se
unlawful tying arrangement.. .. ,,97 Thus, designs that are technically
superior or less expensive can still be deemed anticompetitive if they
are accompanied by associated anticompetitive conduct, but design
conduct alone will never constitute a per se unlawful tying arrange-
ment.98
4. The Third Circuit Adopts Foremost Pro Color Ruling
Additional anticompetitive conduct is difficult to show, as demon-
strated by application of a rule similar to the Foremost Pro Color
rule99 in Innovation Data Processing v. IBM.10 In addition to the
CPUs at issue in Telex,10 1 IBM also sold operating systems to operate
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. L at 542-3.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 585 F. Supp.
1470, 1475-76 (D. N.J. 1984).
101. See Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 270.
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the CPUs. z02 IBM periodically released Installation Productivity Op-
tions (IPOs), which were essentially upgrades to IBM operating sys-
tems.103 At issue in the case was IPO "J", a release that integrated an-
other software program called Data Facilities Data Set Services
(DFDSS), which had previously been licensed separately, into IPO
"J".l04 Innovation sold Fast Dump Restore, a program that competed
with DFDSS. 105 Innovation alleged that IBM had unlawfully tied IPO
"J" and DFDSS, the program necessary to load IPO "J".106 IBM as-
serted technological reasons for the integration. 107 IBM also argued
that IPO "J" was available without DFDSS, or the customer could use
DFDSS to load IPO "J" then cancel the DFDSS license without pen-
alty. 108
The court, ignoring the immense technical and administrative
burden associated with canceling the DFDSS license and switching to
Innovation's program,109 was persuaded by IBM's arguments: "The
integrated IPO 'J' rather than constituting an illegal tying arrangement
instead constitutes... a lawful package of techrologically interrelated
components."' 10 The court held that "as a general rule... the devel-
opment [and] introduction of a system of technologically interrelated
products is not sufficient alone to establish a per se unlawful tying ar-
rangement even if the new products are incompatible with the products
then offered by the competition and effective use of any one of the new
products necessitates purchase of some or all of the others."""' Inno-
vation Data Processing was unable to show the required additional an-
ticompetitive conduct necessary for a finding of a per se tying ar-
rangement, but the court remanded for determination of whether IBM
had violated "general standards of the Sherman and Clayton Acts."'"12
Innovation Data Processing is an interesting case because the
court noted in dicta, without explanation, that continuing to offer the
components separately to avoid a finding of a tie was not necessary, as
102. See Innovation Data Processing Inc., 585 F. Supp. at 1472.
103. See id. at 1473.
104. See id. at 1471, 1473.
105. See id. at 1471.
106. See id. at 1474.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1475.
110. Id. at 1476.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1476-77.
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it had been in Telex."3 "Even if the components of IPO 'J' were not
priced separately and available individually, there would still be no
unlawful 'tie."' 1 14 In spite of this comment, prudence dictates when
integrating two products together, a company should always continue
to offer them separately, at least initially.'1 5
5. Summary of the Tying Arrangement Cases
Foremost Pro Color1 6 and Innovation Data Processing1 7 signal
courts' wariness of condemning engineering decisions as anticompeti-
tive. These cases held that design changes alone will never establish
the coercion element of a per se tying arrangement.' Even the less
stringent test of Telex 19 and Response of Carolina1 20 is ominous to
plaintiffs. These cases held that any design change that results in a
faster or cheaper product will not be condemned as a per se illegal ty-
ing arrangement. 21 This rule allows a company to make performance
neutral design without fear of antitrust liability, provided they cut their
profit margin. As long as the end result is a product that is cheaper to
consumers, there is no violation.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Treatment of Design Conduct as
Monopolization
In order to recover for monopolization in violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show that the defendant has monop-
oly power in the relevant market and that the defendant has willfully
acquired or maintained its monopoly power. 22 Generally, the second
113. Compare Innovation Data Processing Inc., 585 F. Supp. at 1476, and Telex Corp., 367
F. Supp. at 347.
114. Innovation Data Processing Inc., 585 F. Supp. at 1476.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485 at
*8 (D. D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) (distinguishing Telex and Innovation Data Processing from Microsoft
because in those cases, purchase of the integrated product was optional and IBM continued to offer
the component parts separately).
116. Foremost Pro Color Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983).
117. Innovation Data Processing v. International Bus. Machs., 585 F. Supp. 1470 (DN.J.
1470).
118. See Foremost Pro Color Inc., 703 F.2d at 542-43; Innovation Data Processing, 585 F.
Supp. at 1476.
119. Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
120. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976),
121. See Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 342; Response of Carolina, Inc., 537 F.2d at 1330.
122. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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element, willful acquisition and maintenance, is most problematic to
plaintiffs alleging monopolization. 123
1. An Early Rule: CalComp
The Ninth Circuit decided the issue of anticompetitive design as
monopolization in 1979 in Califomia Computer Products v. IBM
("CalComp"). 124 CalComp was another of the IBM CPU cases.125
CalComp claimed that the integration of disk drive control functions
into the CPU was anticompetitive.1 26 CalComp characterized this inte-
gration as a "technological manipulation which did not improve per-
formance."1 27 The CalComp court bluntly stated "IBM, assuming it
was a monopolist, had the right to redesign its products to make them
more attractive to buyers- whether by reason of lower manufacturing
cost and price or improved performance .... IBM need not
have... constricted its product development so as to facilitate sales of
rival products."128 Not only did the reasonableness of BM's conduct
not present a jury issue, the court complained that CalComp's chal-
lenges to the integration of peripherals into the CPU were really claims
that product innovation violated antitrust law. 129
The holding of CalComp is probably an oversimplification. It is
probably false that all changes reducing price are not anticompetitive.
For example, IBM could have made a cost- and performance-neutral
design change that shut out competitors, then lowered prices, knowing
that they would recoup profits lost per unit by selling more units. This
would have been providing equivalent performance at a lower price,
and thus would have been allowed by the CalComp court.130 The
Ninth Circuit in CalComp thus ruled that no design change that im-
proves performance or provides equivalent function at lower cost is
anticompetitive.131
123. See, e.g., California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d
727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979).
124. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727
(9th Cir. 1979).
125. See supra notes 44 - 53 and accompanying text.
126. See California Computer Prods., Inc., 613 F.2d at 731.
127. Id. at 744.
128. California Computer Prods. Inc., 613 F.2d at 744.
129. See id.
130. See id. (noting equivalent function at lower cost is a superior product from the buyer's
point of view and accordingly not an antitrust violation).
131. Seeid.
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2. A District Court Adopts a Rule of Reason:
Transamerica
The Northern District of California decided yet another IBM
case, In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation32
(Transamerica) a few months after CalComp. Unlike Calcomp,
Transamerica indicated a willingness to find design behavior anticom-
petitive if it had no purpose and effect other than to preclude others
from competing.133 However, the court noted "[it is more difficult to
formulate a legal standard for design conduct than it is to imagine
clearly illegal situations."'1 34 Indeed, the situation the court imagined,
where IBM changed the interfaces "with such frequency that PCMs
would have been unable to attach and unable to economically adapt
their peripherals to the ever-changing... designs," 135 is so nakedly an-
ticompetitive that it did not offer any realistic guidance on what design
choices would be considered anticompetitive. Though the situation the
court described as clearly anticompetitive definitely involved an anti-
competitive intent, the court considered then discarded using intent as
the touchstone of anticompetitive design conduct. Because strong pol-
icy reasons favoring innovation trumped reasons for punishing anti-
competitive intentions; "usually many results are intended, and if only
one, even the predominating, intent is illegal, and thus punished, le-
gitimate incentives will be imperiled."'136 The court also questioned the
practicality of such a rule, noting that it is often quite difficult to dis-
cern corporate intent. 37
The Transamerica court settled ultimately on the following test:
"[i]f the design choice is unreasonably restrictive of competition, the
monopolist's conduct violates the Sherman Act."'38 It then analyzed
the three design changes at issue: a change in the interface made be-
tween a tape drive and controller called Aspen, a change in the inter-
face between a disk drive and controller called Mallard, and changes
made to a multiplexor.139
132. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal.
1979, aff'd sub nom. Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d
1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
133. Compare California Computer Prods. Inc., 613 F.2d at 744, with In re IBM Peripheral
EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1002-1003.
134. In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1003.
135. Id. at 1002.
136. Id. at 1003.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 1003-07.
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The Aspen interface was conceded by Transamerica to be a supe-
rior product, thus there was no anticompetitive behavior in modifying
it.140 Though the Mallard design was adopted primarily to preclude
PCM competition, the court decided it was a superior design, noting
that the market segment affected by the change was too small for any
serious precluding effect. 141 In the case of the multiplexor, however,
the court found that IBM had purposely degraded the performance of
the device so that certain competitors' peripherals could not be at-
tached: "The only purpose served and the only effect of the degradation
was the preclusion of competition... . The law need not tolerate de-
liberate acts where the only purpose and effect is to use monopoly
power to gain a competitive advantage."'142 Slowing down the multi-
plexor unreasonably restricted competition and was a violation of the
Sherman Act.143
Transamerica ruled that a design change that degrades perform-
ance unreasonably restricts competition and is therefore anticompeti-
tive, 44 but it did not answer whether design conduct unreasonably re-
stricts competition if it leads to performance that is no better and no
worse than the previous design.
Transamerica was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in 1983.141
3. Foremost Pro Color
In Foremost Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak Co., 46 Foremost Pro
Color alleged monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act in
addition to illegal tying arrangements. 47 After deciding that Kodak's
simultaneous introduction of the Instamatic 110 camera and Kodacolor
II film was not an illegal tying arrangement, the court quickly disposed
of Foremost Pro Color's monopolization allegations.1 48 The court
140. See id. at 1004. Perhaps in reliance on Telex, the court viewed integration of certain
functions into the control unit as evidence of technological superiority.
141. See id. at 1005.
142. Id. at 1007-08.
143. See id. at 1008. The court noted in footnote 109 that the market excluded by this design
change was insignificant, thus a finding of a violation of the Sherman Act must be accompanied by
a finding that Transamerica suffered no injury as a result. See id. at 1008 n.109.
144. See id at 1003.
145. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377,
1378 (9th Cir. 1983) aff'g In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965
(N.D. Cal. 1979).
146. See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
147. See Foremost Pro Color Inc., 703 F.2d at 537.
148. See id. at 544-45.
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stated that the only other anticompetitive design behavior alleged, the
introduction of incompatibilities with then existing products and fin-
ishing equipment, was nothing more than part of the process of inno-
vation and invention.149
The Ninth Circuit initially decided in CalComp that design con-
duct that lowered price or improved performance could never be an
antitrust violation. 150  Then, the court affirmed the rule in Trans-
america that any design conduct that is unreasonably restrictive of
competition is an antitrust violation. 15' Finally, in Foremost Pro
Color, the Ninth Circuit signaled its unwillingness ever to find design
conduct in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, by holding that
the plaintiff must show associated anticompetitive conduct in addition
to a product introduction. 52
C. Monopoly Leveraging and the Second Circuit's Treatment
of Monopolization
1. Monopoly Leveraging Under Berkey Photo
In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Company, the Second
Circuit first recognized a separate form of liability under section 2
known as monopoly leveraging. 53 Monopoly leveraging occurs when
"a seller who has a monopoly in one product.., uses a tie-in to obtain
a competitive advantage in a second market, 'even if there has not been
an attempt to monopolize the second market. ' ' '" 54 Like Foremost Pro
Color, Berkey involved Kodak's release of the 110 instamatic camera
system and Kodacolor If film.155 Berkey claimed the introduction was
anticompetitive because it required independent photo developers to
make expensive equipment changes to continue to be able to develop
Kodak film. 56 Berkey claimed that Kodak was unlawfully using its
149. See id. at 544-45. Foremost Pro Color also alleged that Kodak had violated section 2 of
the Sherman Act by withholding new products until competition forced their introduction. The
court decided this was not a violation of section 2 because a company, even a monopolist, can bring
products to market whenever it wishes. See id.
150. See California Computer Prods. Inc., 613 F.2d at 744.
151. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1003.
152. See Foremost Pro Color, Inc., 703 F.2d at 545.
153. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). See United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485 at *23 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998).
154. United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485 at *23
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) quoting Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 276.
155. Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 268.
156. See id. at290.
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monopoly in the film market to gain an advantage in the photofinishing
and photofinishing equipment markets.
The court noted "it is clear that Kodak did not monopolize or at-
tempt to monopolize the photofinishing or [photofinishing] equipment
markets."' 57 However, "the use of monopoly power attained in one
market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation of sec-
tion 2, even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize the second
market.... But.... a large firm does not violate section 2 simply by
reaping the competitive rewards attributable to its efficient
size .... ,,158 "Only the wielding of power will support recovery in this
context; advantages inuring... by virtue of membership in an inte-
grated firm will not." 59 The Court was unable to determine if Kodak's
introduction of the new photofinishing process was permissible, or a
violation of section 2: "Kodak's ability to gain a rapidly diminishing
competitive advantage with the introduction of the 110 system may
have been attributable to its innovation of a new system of photogra-
phy, and not its monopoly power.160 On the other hand, we cannot
dismiss the possibility that Kodak's monopoly power in other markets
was at least a partial root of its ability to gain an advantage over its
photofinishing competitors.... ." The court ultimately decided a new
trial was necessary to decide this issue.161
Monopoly leveraging is very similar to tying. A plaintiff alleging
monopoly leveraging must satisfy a two prong test substantially similar
to the last two prongs of the per se tying arrangement test. 62 The mo-
nopoly leveraging plaintiff must show a monopoly in one market,
analogous to the economic power in the tying market prong of the per
se tying arrangement.163 The monopoly leveraging plaintiff must also
show a competitive advantage gained in a second market, analogous to
the effect on not an insubstantial amount of commerce prong of the per
se tying arrangement test.164 Under both the monopoly leveraging test
and the per se tying arrangement test, the effect in the second market
157. Id. at 291.
158. Id. at 276.
159. Id. at291.
160. Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 292.
161. See id.
162. Compare Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 276, with Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S.
at 5-6.
163. Compare Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 276, with Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S.
at 5-6.
164. Compare Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 276, with Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S.
at 5-6.
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need not rise to the level of monopolization. 165 The difference between
monopoly leveraging and tying appears to be in the first prong of the
per se tying arrangement test: the existence of two products, the pur-
chase of one conditioned on the purchase of the other.166 The monop-
oly leveraging theory of liability under section 2 does not appear to re-
quire the plaintiff to show two products tied together, a difficulty that
has plagued plaintiffs in many technological tying cases.' 67
Since Berkey Photo, however, the theory of monopoly leveraging
as a separate section 2 violation has had limited success. In Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected mo-
nopoly leveraging as an independent theory of liability under section
2.168
"Even in the two market situation, a plaintiff cannot establish a
violation of section 2 without proving that the defendant used its
monopoly power in one market to obtain, or attempt to attain, a
market in the downstream, or leveraged market. We believe
Berkey Photo misapplied the elements of section 2 by concluding
that a firm violates section 2 merely by obtaining a competitive
advantage in the second market, even in the absence of an attempt
to monopolize the leveraged market."'169
In addition, United States v. Microsoft noted substantial aca-
demic criticism of monopoly leveraging as a separate violation of sec-
tion 2.170
2. Monopolization Under Berkey Photo
On Berkey's other section 2 claims, the court was not persuaded
that the design changes at issue were anticompetitive because though
they rendered Kodacolor X and its associated developing equipment
and chemicals obsolete. The "use of Kodacolor II did not in itself cre-
ate any incompatibilities with an existing camera."'171 Also, the court
noted that "Kodak's new format was primarily a camera development"
not a film development. 172 Thus, introducing a new camera and a new
165. See Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 276.
166. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
167. See Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 347.
168. See Alaska Airlines Inc. v. United Airlines Inc., 948 F.2d 536,547 (9th Cir.1991).
169. Ik at547.
170. United States v. Microsoft, No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485 at *24 (D.D.C.
Sept. 14, 1998).
171. Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 283.
172. Id.
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film to match the camera simultaneously could probably not be anti-
competitive to businesses that competed with Kodak's film and film
processing. However, the court did note that Kodak's unwillingness to
produce Kodacolor II in the old film formats could be customer coer-
cion, anticompetitive behavior sufficient to show an unlawful tying ar-
rangement. However, Berkey showed no evidence that customers who
would have bought Berkey cameras bought Kodak cameras instead so
they could use the new Kodacolor II film. 173
3. Northeastern Telephone
Northeastern Telephone Company v. AT&T tackled the question
of how to handle alleged monopolization by design conduct that does
not involve a product integration. 174 At issue in the case was the de-
sign of a device by AT&T that would allow customers to use non-Bell
devices on Bell communication networks.1 75 When the FCC invali-
dated AT&T's practice of preventing customers from connecting their
own terminal equipment into Bell communications networks, North-
eastern attempted to compete in the terminal equipment market. 76 To
protect the Bell networks from electrical harm, the FCC approved an
AT&T plan to require devices called protective couplers.177 North-
eastern charges AT&T overdesigned the couplers to make them expen-
sive and subject to break down, hampering Northeastern's efforts to
compete in the business terminal equipment market. 78 The district
court returned a verdict for Northeastern. 79
The Second Circuit noted at the outset its desire not to have to de-
cide the merits of design choices. "In Berkey Photo,... this Court
plumbed the crosscurrents of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. .., hold-
ing that dominant firms, having lawfully acquired monopoly power,
must be allowed to engage in the rough and tumble of competition."1 0
Relying on a National Academy of Sciences panel which found
AT&T's coupler's reliance on an external power source to be "a sig-
nificant and probably unnecessary disadvantage", the court found that
173. See id. at 288.
174. See Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
175. See id. at 81.
176. See id. at 80.
177. See id. at 81.
178. See id.
179. See id at 82.
180. Id. at 79.
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the jury could have considered this to be anticompetitive behavior.',
The case was remanded on the issue of whether the coupler design was
anticompetitive because the jury had not specified its reasons for find-
ing for Northeastern. 82 The Court concluded that AT&T's disadvan-
tageous design could be considered anticompetitive. Thus, any design
that does not pose disadvantages, or in other words, is technologically
advantageous or superior will not be anticompetitive. The Northeast-
ern court appears to adopt a rule similar to the CalComp rule that no
superior or cheaper design will be deemed anticompetitive.183
Northeastern essentially held that where there is a design change
that does not involve integration, the defendant need only show that its
new design is technologically superior to or cheaper than the previous
design. 18
4. The Differences between Berkey and Northeastern
Telephone: GAF v. Kodak
A District Court noted the differences between Berkey and North-
eastern in GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.185 The facts were simi-
lar to Berkey and Foremost Pro Color.186 The court noted a difference
between the monopoly leveraging and monopolization rules and the
rule for other design conduct: "[the] use of monopoly power in one
market to gain an advantage in another market, as well as use of mo-
nopoly power in the same market, is condemned by [the Sherman Act].
Less clear is the scrutiny to be afforded design conduct."' 87 The court
then added to the rule articulated in Northeastern.'88 It reasoned that
because the FCC had granted AT&T the exclusive right to make the
couplers, there was no competition in the market, and thus the holding
of Northeastern should be limited to those situations where market
181. Id. at 94-95. The coupler's reliance on an external power source was found to be unnec-
essary because there was power available from the phone lines that could be used to supply power
to the coupler. The external power source was a serious disadvantage because it meant customers
using equipment that required couplers lost the use of the equipment when the power went out,
while Bell customers did not lose the use of their equipment because their equipment was powered
by the telephone lines. See id. at 81 n.5.
182. See id. at 94-95.
183. See supra notes 124-131 and accompanying text.
184. See Northeastern Tel. Co., 651 F.2d at 94.
185. See GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
186. See supra notes 86-90, 155-156 and accompanying text.
187. GAF Corp., 519 F. Supp. at 1226.
188. See Northeastern TeL Co., 651 F.2d at 94.
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forces cannot operate.8 9 However, the court decided that market
forces are constrained not just where there is a government-granted
monopoly, as in Northeastern, but also where there is coercive conduct
that affects consumer choice.190
In addition, the court decided that the design chosen need only be
reasonable, not necessarily the design alternative least restrictive of
competition.191 The court came down to the following rule: "the 'rea-
sonableness' of the design of a monopolist's new products ... may be
scrutinized... in cases in which 'market forces cannot operate'-that
is .... [when] a single firm controls the entire market-or in which a mo-
nopolist engages in coercive conduct to affect consumer choice.'
92
5. Summary of the Ninth and Second Circuit Rules on
Monopolization
The Ninth Circuit in CalComp decided that design conduct that
lowers price or improves performance can never constitute a violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act.193 Transamerica backed away from
that absolute rule and decided that design changes that are unreasona-
bly restrictive of competition violate section 2.194
The Second Circuit's stand on section 2 monopolization by design
conduct is not as clear. The Second Circuit may still recognize mo-
nopoly leveraging as an independent section 2 violation.195 In addition,
Northeastern held any design change that results in a superior cheaper
product does not violate section 2.196 GAF approved of the rule in
Northeastern, but held that design conduct can only be scrutinized un-
der that rule when market forces cannot operate; that is, where a mo-
nopolist coerces consumers. 97
The Supreme Court has not yet heard a case that involves anti-
competitive design conduct.
189. See GAF Corp., 519 F. Supp. at 1228.
190. See GAF Corp., 519 F. Supp. at 1228.
191. Seeid.
192. Id. Applying the rule to the facts of the case, the court dismissed Kodak's summary
judgment motion, stating that an issue of fact existed as to whether Kodak coerced film developers
to convert to a new processing method. See id. at 1229.
193. See California Computer Prods Inc., 603 F.2d at 744.
194. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices., 481 F. Supp. at 1002.
195. See Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 276.
196. See Northeastern Tel. Co., 651 F.2d at 94.
197. See GAF Corp., 519 F. Supp. at 1228.
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IV. UNITED STATES v. MICROSOFT
A. Introduction
Microsoft Corp. markets the Windows operating system. "An
operating system is, so to speak, the central nervous system of the
computer, controlling the computer's interaction with peripherals such
as keyboards and printers.... Operating systems also serve as 'plat-
forms' for application software such as word processors" 19 by pro-
viding general functions available for use by application software pro-
grams. 199  The structure of these general functions differ for every
operating system.200 As a result, application programs are not plat-
form independent; that is, they are specific to a particular operating
system. 2 1 Microsoft has acquired a significant market share in the op-
erating system market due to IBM's decision in the early 1980s to in-
stall Microsoft's operating system on its personal computers.202
The Internet is a global computer network.203 The World Wide
Web is a interactive graphical interface to the Internet.204 A browser is
a software program that can be used to search for, retrieve, and view
documents on the World Wide Web.205 Netscape currently makes the
most widely used Internet browser.206 Microsoft responded to Net-
scape's success by developing Internet Explorer ("IE"), a competing
browser.207
The development of Internet browsers may threaten Microsoft's
dominance of the operating system market, because browsers can pro-
vide general functions to application programs like an operating system
and thus function as a platform. 28 The United States alleged that in
order to protect its operating system monopoly, Microsoft attempted to
use its dominance in the operating system market to leverage into and
198. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935,938 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
199. See id. at 938-39.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See United States Department of Justice, Memorandum of the United States in Support
of Petition for an Order to Show Cause Why Respondent Microsoft Corporation Should Not Be
Found in Civil Contempt at 7, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(No. 94-1564) [hereinafter DOJ Memorandum].
204. See id. at 7-8.
205. See id. at 8.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 9.
208. See Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 939.
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control the browser market, so that a Microsoft product would remain
the preferred software platform.209
B. Procedural History
1. United States v. Microsoft I, Filed 1994
In 1994, the United States filed suit against Microsoft for unlaw-
fully maintaining a monopoly in the personal computer operating sys-
tem market.2 10 Microsoft consented to entry of judgment against it.
Final judgment was entered in 1995.211 The Final Judgment consent
decree prevented Microsoft from using its monopoly power by condi-
tioning operating system licenses on either licenses for other Microsoft
products or promises to not license or distribute any non-Microsoft
products. Specifically, section IV(E) of the consent decree states
Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the
terms of that agreement are expressly or impliedly conditioned
upon: (i) the licensing of any other Covered Product, Operating
System Software product or other product, (provided, however,
that this provision in and of itself shall not be construed to pro-
hibit Microsoft from developing integrated products) .... 212
After the entry of the consent decree, the Department of Justice
learned that beginning in February 1998, Microsoft intended to require
original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") to install Microsoft's
Internet browser, IE, as part of the Windows 95 operating system.
213
The Department of Justice (DOJ) felt this was a violation of section
IV(E) of the consent decree, and subsequently petitioned for an order
to show cause why Microsoft should not be found in civil contempt.
214
The district court entered a preliminary injunction forbidding Mi-
crosoft from licensing the use of Windows 95 or any successor Micro-
soft operating system on the condition that the licensee also license and
install Internet Explorer or any successor Microsoft Internet browser
software.215 The D.C. Circuit clarified section V(E) and reversed the
injunction, holding that the district court erred in granting the injunc-
tion because it did not find that there would be irreparable injury with-
209. See DOJ Memorandum at 6-11.
210. See id. at6.
211. Seeid.
212. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 939.
213. Seeid at940.
214. See DOJ Memorandum at 2.
215. See Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 940.
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out the injunction.216 In reversing the injunction, the D.C. Circuit reit-
erated courts' distaste for evaluating product designs: "Antitrust schol-
ars have long recognized the undesirability of having courts oversee
product design, and any dampening of technological innovation would
be at crosspurposes with antitrust law. Thus, [we] ... read... section
IV(E) as permitting any genuine technological integration. '217 The
court went on to attempt to give substantive meaning to the concept of
integration. "We think that an 'integrated product' is most reasonably
understood as a product that combines functionalities... in a way that
offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities are bought sepa-
rately and combined by the purchaser."218 The court then concluded
that Windows 95 and IE were an integrated product.
2. United States v. Microsoft II, Filed May 1998
On May 18, 1998, the United States Department of Justice and
twenty states' attorney's general filed complaints against Microsoft
alleging violations of federal and state antitrust laws. 219 The com-
plaints alleged, among other things, that Microsoft unreasonably re-
strained competition by "tying" its Internet browser to Windows 98.
Microsoft moved for summary judgment on all counts.220
Citing Telex221 and Response of Carolina,222 Microsoft argued
that courts considering alleged tying arrangements involving questions
of product design and product integration, like the Windows
98/Internet Explorer integration at issue, should apply a more deferen-
tial standard that other tying cases.223 The Court stated, "this Court is
not convinced that either the IBM cases or Foremost Pro Color dictate
that Microsoft's licensing practices should be evaluated by a more le-
nient standard... simply because the case involves 'physically inte-
grated products or questions of product design,' as Microsoft puts
it."224
216. Id. at 952-53.
217. Id. at 10.
218. Id.
219. United States v. Microsoft, No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485, at *1 (D. D.C.
Sept. 14, 1998).
220. La
221. Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
222. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
223. United States v. Microsoft, No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept.
14, 1998).
224. Id. at *9.
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The Court noted that the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia, in reversing the District Court's preliminary injunction which
prevented Microsoft from requiring original equipment manufacturers
to take Internet Explorer as a condition of licensing Windows 95,
seemed to have adopted Microsoft's proposed more lenient technologi-
cal tying standard. 22 The Court of Appeals wrote that the ultimate is-
sue in technological tying cases is whether the "integrated design offers
benefits when compared to a purchaser's combination of corresponding
stand-alone functionalities. '226  A court analyzes these integration
benefits to determine if an alleged technological tie is really a tying ar-
rangement of separate products.227 In addition to the integration bene-
fits, the Court of Appeals held, Microsoft must also show "some rea-
son Microsoft, rather than the OEMs or end users, must bring the
functionalities together." 228
Applying these tests, the Court denied most of Microsoft's sum-
mary judgment motion.229 The Court concluded it needed more facts to
determine if the integration benefits claimed by Microsoft were unique
to the Windows/Internet Explorer combination, and thus evidence of a
truly integrated product, not a tying arrangement. 230 In addition, the
court needed more facts to determine whether Microsoft's integration
was more beneficial than an integration by an OEM or the con-
sumer.
23
'
The Court also distinguished Microsoft's behavior from the be-
havior of the defendants in the cases Microsoft cited in support of its
more lenient technological tying standard: "The allegations in the pres-
ent case differ from the IBM allegations in one critical respect: plain-
tiffs allege that Microsoft did not just bundle IE into Windows 98, but
took the further step of contractually prohibiting OEMs from unbun-
dling the two .... In contrast, in Telex, there was no forced tie of
memory and control functions. The integration was 'wholly optional,'
and IBM continued to offer the two products separately." 232 The court
noted: "neither the U.S. nor the States challenges Microsoft's right to
bundle Internet Explorer and Windows. Instead, they challenge the
225. Id.
226. Id. at *10 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
227. Id. at*11.
228. Id. (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at *8.
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contractual prohibitions against unbundling, and Microsoft's refusal to
offer what plaintiffs allege are two products separately. '233
The Microsoft II trial started October 19, 1998.234
C. Analysis under Monopolization and Tying Arrangement
Rules
Microsoft's relevant behavior alleged in Microsoft I and Micro-
soft II is substantially the same: the integration of IE into the Windows
operating system. This behavior is analyzed under the above case law,
considering the facts alleged in the DOJ's Memorandum in Support of
an Order to Show Cause in Microsoft 1235 and Microsoft's Memoran-
dum in Opposition.236
The DOJ alleges that Microsoft went beyond legitimate
competition by trying to use its Windows operating system monopoly
to coerce computer manufacturers to license and distribute Internet
Explorer ("IE"). Microsoft's behavior suggests that it treats IE as a
separate product. Microsoft has distributed IE as a separate product,
it has developed IE for non-Windows platforms, and it has described
E as a separate product in internal memoranda. In addition, Microsoft
has treated IE differently from other Windows updates. With other
updates, Microsoft does not advertise the new feature, it does not track
the new feature in a market separate from the operating system market,
it does not make the new feature available separately from the
operating system, and it does not make the new feature available for
non-Microsoft systems. In contrast, Microsoft has done all of these
things with IE. In addition to Microsoft's apparent belief that IE is a
separate product, it is well accepted in the industry that browsers are
separate products from operating systems. Finally, it is possible to
physically separate Windows and LE.237
Microsoft claims that integration has created technological bene-
fits that would be lost if Microsoft allowed computer manufacturers to
install Windows without LE. Also, Microsoft does not prevent com-
233. Id. at *9.
234. Joel Brinkley, As Microsoft Trial Gets Started, Gates' Credibility is Questioned, N.Y.
TIMES at Al, Oct. 20,1998.
235. DOJ Memorandum.
236. Microsoft, Memorandum in Opposition to Petition of the United States for an Order to
Show Cause Why Respondent Microsoft Corporation Should Not be Found in Civil Contempt,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 94-1564) [hereinafter Mi-
crosoft Memorandum].
237. DOJ Memorandum, 19-27.
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puter manufacturers from installing Netscape Navigator or any other
browser in addition to the IE element of Windows. Finally, Microsoft
does not prevent end users from deleting any portion of Windows if
they choose not to use it, though Microsoft points out that if the user
chooses to delete any portion of Windows, including IE, she runs the
risk that Windows will not function properly. 238
1. Hypothetical: If the DOJ Alleged a Tying Arrangement
a. The Associated Conduct Rule of Innovation:
Data Processing and Foremost Pro Color
Microsoft's integration of IE and Windows is analogous to the
situation in Innovation Data Processing v. IBM.2 39 Innovation Data
Processing and Foremost Pro Color held that design changes alone
will never establish the coercion element of a per se tying arrange-
ment.240 The DOJ will probably not be able to show the required asso-
ciated anticompetitive conduct to establish a violation under this test.
Microsoft presented a unified front on the question whether 1E was a
separate product. There were no task forces convened for the specific
purpose of finding a way to reduce exposure to competition, as there
were in the IBM cases.241 Even the memos that the DOJ used to show
Microsoft considered E a separate product show a desire only to de-
velop a competitive browser, not to leverage into the browser market
by using Microsoft's operating system monopoly.242 Thus, under the
Third and Ninth Circuit associated anticompetitive conduct rules, Mi-
crosoft's behavior would probably not be a violation.
b. The Cheaper and Faster Rule of Response of
Carolina and Telex
Applying the rule of Response of Carolina and Telex, that a
cheaper or better product can never be a tying arrangement, would not
likely change this result.243 The DOJ has offered no evidence that Mi-
238. See Microsoft Memorandum at 5-8.
239. See Innovation Data Processing Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 585 F. Supp.
1470 (1984), supra notes 100-115 and accompanying text.
240. See Foremost Pro Color Inc., 703 F.2d at 542-43; Innovation Data Processing Inc.,
585 F. Supp. at 1476.
241. See Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 293 (noting IBM convened a task force to study and
recommend plans and product strategies to impede the growth of IBM's plug compatible competi-
tion).
242. See Microsoft Memorandum at 21-26.
243. See Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 342; Response of Carolina Inc., 537 F.2d at 1330.
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crosoft combined the products with no technological benefit. Indeed,
Microsoft has alleged that the integration created a superior product. 44
Also, the DOJ offered no evidence of a specific anticompetitive intent.
Anticompetitive intent and lack of a technological benefit are required
by the Fifth Circuit rule in Response of Carolina v. Leasco Re-
sponse.245 Thus, the DOJ would probably not prevail under either Re-
sponse of Carolina or Telex.
2. Hypothetical: If the DOJ Alleged Monopolization
a. The Ninth Circuit
According to Transamerica, as long as a design is not unreasona-
bly restrictive of competition, it is not a violation of section 2.246 It is
unlikely that the Ninth Circuit would consider the integration of EE and
Windows to be any different from the integrations the court accepted in
Transamerica.247 In addition, CalComp decided that design conduct
that reduces price or improves performance can never constitute a
violation of section 2.248 As Microsoft has alleged improved perform-
ance from the integration, the DOJ would probably not prevail under
the CalComp rule.249 Thus, it is unlikely the DOJ would prevail in the
Ninth Circuit.
b. The Second Circuit
If monopoly leveraging under Berkey Photo is still a viable theory
of recovery under section 2, Microsoft has probably violated section 2
according to the second circuit rule. Under Berkey Photo, monopoly
leveraging occurs when a seller with a monopoly uses a tie-in to gain
an advantage in a second market.25 0 Microsoft no doubt has a monop-
oly in the operating system market, and there is no question Microsoft
used any market power it had in the operating system market to secure
a competitive advantage, a favorable spot on the desktop for IE, in the
Internet browser market.25' Whether Windows and IE is one integrated
244. See Microsoft Memorandum at 7.
245. See Response of Carolina Inc. v. Leasco Response Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (1976), supra
notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
246. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1003.
247. See California Computer Prods. Inc., 613 F.2d at 744.
248. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 1003-07, supra notes 138-143
and accompanying text.
249. See Microsoft Memorandum at 7.
250. See Berkey Photo Inc., 603 F.2d at 276.
251. See Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 938-39.
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product or two tied products appears to be irrelevant to the question
whether Microsoft unlawfully leveraged its operating system monop-
oly.252 Thus, under the second circuit monopoly leveraging rule, Mi-
crosoft has violated section 2.
3. Conclusion
Application of existing case law, with the exception of the heavily
criticized monopoly leveraging rule of Berkey Photo,253 would proba-
bly have brought a court to the same conclusion to which the D.C. Cir-
cuit tentatively came, that Windows and IE are an integrated product,
not an antitrust violation.214 Under existing antitrust law, this is almost
certainly the proper result.
The question remains, is this the best result? Even if Microsoft's
bundling of Windows and IE is not a violation of the antitrust laws,
there is no doubt that bundling stifles innovation. "While bundling
sometimes seems to provide free goods to the user, those goods are
never truly free if the effect is to drive out or discourage innovative
competitors for the bundled product.... Once rivals are blocked from
the market or knocked out of it, those erstwhile rivals will obviously
never innovate there again. Nor can they push the bundler to improve
its own product (like Netscape apparently did for Microsoft) in order
to retain its market position."' 5
Microsoft's dominance in the operating system market will no
doubt make IE successful in the Internet browser market. While the
usual parade of horribles that is forecast for a market with only one
dominant player; no innovation, high prices, inferior products; has not
occurred yet in either market, the specter looms. Thus, if Microsoft
has not broken the law, perhaps the law needs to be changed.
V. ALTERNATrVEs
There are several alternatives to the courts' current approach to
analyzing design choices for anticompetitive behavior. The simplest
choice is more judicial scrutiny of engineering decisions. The courts
should no longer defer to the litigants on issues of technical merit. In
cases scrutinizing design conduct, courts continually voice their oppo-
252. See supra notes 162-167 and accompanying text.
253. See Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). See
Microsoft Corp., 1998 WL 614485 at *24.
254. See Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 952.
255. Eliot G. Disner, Microsoft: IBM Redux?, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 1998, at 8, 12.
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sition to overseeing product design,256 but this is more likely fear of the
technology itself, not fear of having courts oversee design, as courts
already decide the merits of product design in product liability case.
There is, of course, no way to predict whether increased judicial scru-
tiny of the technical merits of a product design would change the result
in any of the cases analyzed. However, more judicial scrutiny would
even the scales of justice by removing the apparent presumption that a
defendant's self-serving declarations of the benefits of a design are
true. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should decide whether the legal
standards for product design cases are more. lenient than for other an-
titrust cases.
In addition, to avoid stifling innovation, courts could create safe-
guards that a company can follow to ensure that a design alternative
will not be deemed anticompetitive, such as requiring that companies
continue to offer the parts of an integrated product separately.
Also, there is always the alternative of new legislation or regula-
tion. "[A]ntitrust [law] was not intended to rule the world, nor is it
well suited for that task."'257 Congress can correct any market failure
caused by anticompetitive design choices through regulation. How-
ever, the problems with various courts' approaches to anticompetitive
design conduct are not serious enough to warrant new legislation or
regulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though there are some problems with the way courts have used
the antitrust laws to regulate design conduct of today that damages a
monopolist's competitors, the laws can still effectively regulate design
conduct with more judicial scrutiny of technical decisions. With clear
256. See Disner, supra note 255, at 11 (noting that the Court of Appeals opinion in the Micro-
soft case, while admonishing that courts not second-guess a manufacturer's design decisions, be-
trayed a deep understanding of the technology issues in the case).
257. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 47 at 98.
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rules companies can continue to innovate without fear of antitrust in-
volvement. Thus the 108 year old Sherman Act can effectively regu-
late high technology and information based businesses. "[T]he
Sherman Act has a basic effective vitality which emerges from time to
time in an effort to safeguard competition in America. Those who be-
lieve that the antitrust laws have lost their vitality had best beware." 8
258. 1 THE ANTITRUST IMPULSE, supra note 4, at 20. From Did Sherman Want to Break
The "Trusts"? by James K Withrow, Jr. The article tells the story of a person that Withrow knew
who ran errands for Rockefeller. Once, this person was given an envelope to deliver to Senator
Sherman containing $10,000 for the Senator's assurance that the antitrust law passed would be
mild and without real teeth.

